the power of right

This post is a response to those that argue that America and Americans can do whatever they want “anytime, anyplace and in any which way we damn well please” - It doesn’t matter what others think of us. The problem with this perspective is that it ignores one major dimension of power: soft power. The purpose of power is to get others to act as you want them to act. States can do this in three ways: coercion, persuasion, and socialization. Coercion or “sticks,” as it is referred to in the policy world, means punishing behavior that is contrary to what you wish until the behavior comes inline with your interests. Coercion can be exercised through economic or military means. The U.S. used coercive power both when it attacked Iraq during the first Gulf War and when it imposed sanctions following the war. Persuasion or “carrots” refers to rewarding behavior that is inline with your wishes and is exercised primarily through economic means. The U.S. uses persuasive power when it gives aid to developing democracies.

The final type of power is socialization or getting others to want what you want. Socialization is exercised through “soft power” – the attractiveness of your ways. In other words, soft power causes others to act in the way you want them to by getting them to want to act in that way. The U.S. might force other states to make liberalizing reforms by giving them aid or threatening invasion, but they can also get others to make these reforms by getting people in the state to think that making such reforms is the right way to act. Soft power, therefore, is the best kind of power to have because it requires the least material resources from the state exercising it. Coercion and persuasion require the use of material value – money, soldiers, etc. Socialization only requires that your culture, values, and actions are attractive.

What does this mean for today? Success in the war on terrorism means stopping terrorists from carrying out attacks anywhere in the world. The only way to really win is by making no one want to commit terrorist acts. In other words, by using power to get other to act as we want (i.e. not as terrorists). Let’s dissect how the three types of power can be used in this war. Coercion is useful when we can identify actors to punish. It is necessary to strike forcefully at terror groups (when we can pinpoint their location) and at states that harbor terrorists. But this is not enough. Terrorists operate in most countries throughout the world (including our own) and it seems that there is an endless supply of new recruits. Persuasion is useful in convincing states that harbor terrorists to fight them. But as we see with Saudi Arabia, to which we give plenty of money for oil and yet who continues to allow radical Islam to thrive, it is not enough. In the end, our most useful form of power is soft power. If we can convince every terrorist and potential terrorist that our way of life is better and that terrorism is wrong, then they will not commit acts of terrorism. We could spend forever fighting terrorism with our military. Only if we use our soft power is a true victory possible.

How can we use soft power in the war on terrorism? The simple answer is by acting in a way that makes others want to act like us. We’re going to make Iraq terrorist free (at least in the long run) by making it a democracy. But we’re not going to make it a democracy through coercion or persuasion. We can’t constantly threaten Iraq into being a democracy, nor can we persuade it through material benefits to be a democracy. The only way we can achieve our goal in Iraq is by making the Iraqi people want to be a democracy. By showing them that liberal democracy really is the best form of political organization. If liberal democracy means a lack of security and the torture of prisoners without a just judicial process, as it currently does is Iraq, then I’m not sure I would even choose it. Sure, it may cost us in the short term – in lives and money – to emphasize soft power, but it is the only way we will win in the long run. We must, therefore, act in Iraq as a perfect model. We cannot just make Iraq better than it was under Saddam. We have to make it as perfect as liberal democracy can be. And this is not just an ends argument in any sense. The means are almost as important as the ends. In order to convince Iraqis to join in our efforts to make their country better, we need to use means that make them want what we are trying to help them create. This means not torturing prisoners and being more careful in preventing civilian causalities, among other things. I’m still optimistic that we can succeed in Iraq and the greater war on terrorism, but not by forcing others to want what we want; only by convincing them that they want it themselves.

no, you’re for this and i’m for that.

This is probably the only time that I will blog about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict since it’s not worth the high blood pressure that such posts would surely cause, but something I noticed…

Ignoring some of the valid claims against the Israeli withdrawal proposal…who would have ever thought that one day Ariel Sharon would be calling for withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantling of outlying settlements on the West Bank while the Palestinians and much of the international community cry out against Israeli withdrawal?

Just one of those “whoa” moments.

kerrying a lot of baggage

As much as I hate publicly criticizing the candidate I hope will win, it is necessary for Democrats to recognize that John Kerry has his faults. Most obvious is the characterization of Kerry as a wishy-washy, flip-flopping, pander-bear. These accusations will be no more harmful than in the realm of national security.

The argument that Kerry is wishy-washy, having no strong ideological beliefs, is evidenced by his varying positions on the War in Iraq. On October 11th, 2002, Kerry voted in favor of the legislation authorizing the President to “use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” in Iraq (Text of resolution). On October 15th, 2002, however, Kerry told a group of Democrats that he had not voted to give the President the authority to act unilaterally, which he said would be unjustified. Instead he argued that, “every single member of the United States Senate moved to take it to the UN with a willingness to enforce through the United Nations if that is the will of the international community."

Kerry’s position on the Israeli security fence shows his tendency to flip-flop on issues and pander to his audience. On October 17, 2003, Kerry told a conference of the Arab American Institute that he understood “how disheartened Palestinians are by the Israeli government's decision to build the barrier off of the green line - cutting deep into Palestinian areas. We don't need another barrier to peace," he concluded (Kerry's remarks). Only four months later, on February 29, 2004, at a meeting with 40 Jewish organizational leaders, Kerry assured them that he supported Israel’s right to build a security barrier, which he saw as a matter of self-defense.

A final example, noted on January 28 on The New Republic’s “etc.” blog, demonstrates the extremes of Kerry’s pandering, taking whatever side is most politically opportune. A Kerry constituent wrote the Senator twice, conveying two contradictory positions about the 1991 Gulf War. In the first letter he thanked Kerry for his opposition to the war and received a response saying, “I [Kerry] share your concerns…[and] voted in favor of a resolution that would have insisted that economic sanctions be given more time to work and against a resolution giving the president the immediate authority to go to war." Nine days later, he received a response to his second letter, in which he had expressed support for the war, to which Kerry responded: “From the outset of the invasion, I have strongly and unequivocally supported President Bush's response to the crisis and the policy goals he has established with our military deployment in the Persian Gulf" (Etc. blog entry).

What must Democrats do to ensure that this doesn’t cripple to party on what will be the most important issue in November? First, Kerry must choose which side he’s on, in the policy areas in which he has yet to clearly articulate a position (i.e. most of them). Then, he should adopt the “winning, democratic national security strategy” that I propose here: http://www.princeton.edu/~in/may04/grinberg.htm.